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Boundless Ontologies: 
Michael Snow, Wittgenstein, 
and the Textual Film
by JUSTIN REMES
Abstract: While most fi lms use moving images as their primary currency, there are sev-
eral experimental fi lms—such as Michael Snow’s So Is This (1982)—that instead traffi c 
in the written word. This article argues that such experiments problematize rigid con-
ceptions of fi lm’s ontology and instead foreground the usefulness of a Wittgensteinian 
approach to cinema.
Unlike a book in your hand, a fi lm keeps on going whether you like it or 
not. For it has an existence of  its own. A microcosm larger than life, its 
boundaries are boundless. —James Broughton1
The fi lm of  tomorrow will be lettrist and composed of  subtitles. If  at its 
conception cinema was by virtue of  its images an attack on reading, the day 
will come when the cinema will be a mere form of reading.
—Isidore Isou2
M arcel Duchamp’s Anémic cinéma (1926) is one of  the most unusual fi lms ever made, even by the standards of  the early European avant-garde. It partly comprises a series of  fi lmed roto-reliefs, vertiginous rotating spirals moving at a variety of  speeds. If  this were Anémic cinéma’s sole content, it would 
be a compelling abstract fi lm in the tradition of  Walter Ruttmann’s Lichtspiel Opus 
I (1921), Hans Richter’s Rhythmus 21 (1921), and Viking Eggeling’s Symphonie di-
agonale (1924). However, the shots of  the roto-reliefs are interspersed with shots of  
ostensibly nonsensical written text: spinning phrases replete with alliteration, puns, 
1 Quoted in Follow Your Own Weird: The World of James Broughton (Chicago: Facets Cine-Notes, 2006), 31.
2 Quoted in Thomas Y. Levin, “Dismantling the Spectacle: The Cinema of Guy Debord,” in Guy Debord and the 
Situationist International: Texts and Documents, ed. Tom McDonough (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 441–
442 (italics in original). The passage is taken from Isou’s obscure 1954 fi lm Apology of a Unique Personality 
(Apologie d’un personnage unique).
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and sexually suggestive double entendres (Figure 1). Here is a sampling of  Duchamp’s 
Dadaist wordplay:
The child who nurses is a sucker of  hot flesh and does not like the cauliflower 
of  the hot glass-house.
If  I give you a penny, will you give me a pair of  scissors [i.e. a fuck]?
Incest or family passion, in blows too drawn out.
Have you ever put the marrow of  the sword into the stove of  the loved one?3
The centrality of  language in 
Anémic cinéma challenged the 
widespread assumption that 
imagery—whether abstract or 
representational—was to be 
film’s sole currency. Duchamp’s 
cinematic vision was far more 
inclusive. He clearly sided with 
surrealist poet Robert Desnos, 
who asserted, “Everything that 
can be projected on the screen 
belongs in the cinema, letters as 
well as faces.”4
 Written text in a film was 
nothing new, of  course. Text 
had frequently been used in cinematic introductions, credit sequences, and intertitles. 
Indeed, intertitles were so ubiquitous in the era of  silent cinema that the handful of  
films that disavowed them—such as F. W. Murnau’s The Last Laugh (1924), Dimitri 
Kirsanoff ’s Ménilmontant (1926), and Dziga Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera (1929)—
were the exceptions that proved the rule.5 Still, Anémic cinéma’s use of  text departed 
dramatically from its predecessors. Unlike conventional cinematic text, Duchamp’s 
language served no narrative (or even paratextual) purpose. Instead, the function of  
the words was primarily poetic (or, in the spirit of  Dadaism, anti-poetic). Text no lon-
ger needed to be relegated to a subservient role. In the post-Duchampian world, the 
3 Translations from the French text are taken from Katrina Martin, “Marcel Duchamp’s Anémic Cinéma,” Studio 
international 189, no. 973 (1975): 53–60. The original French sentences appear as follows: “L’enfant qui tête est un 
souffleur de chair chaude et n’aime pas le chou-fleur de serre chaude.” “Si je te donne un sou, me donneras tu une 
paire de ciseaux?” “Inceste ou passion de famille, à coups trop tirés.” “Avez vous déja mis la moëlle de l’épée dans 
le poêle de l’aimée?” Given the complexity and polysemy of the original French text, Martin correctly points out that a 
faithful English translation of Anémic cinéma is “impossible.”
4 Quoted in P. Adams Sitney, “Image and Title in Avant-Garde Cinema,” October 11 (1979): 102.
5 Silent films without intertitles did not necessarily forgo written text altogether. For example, as Scott MacDonald 
points out, Murnau still managed to smuggle written language into The Last Laugh “within the imagery.” See Scott 
MacDonald, ed., Screen Writings: Scripts and Texts by Independent Filmmakers (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995), 2.
Figure 1. Cryptic language appears on a revolving disk in Marcel 
Duchamp’s Anémic cinéma (1926; Kino International, 2005).
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written word could be just as central to a film as imagery.6 The door had been opened 
for a new kind of  cinema: the textual film. Rather than being composed of  photo-
graphic or animated imagery, these works would foreground letters, words, numbers, 
punctuation marks, and other forms of  handwritten or typographical text—challeng-
ing what Hollis Frampton has called the “logophobia” endemic to cinema and other 
visual arts.7
 The prominence of  text in avant-garde film has received a fair amount of  scholarly 
attention.8 However, the implications of  these intermedia experiments have not yet 
been adequately theorized. I want to argue that text-based cinema challenges wide-
spread preconceptions of  what a film can do (and be) while also highlighting cinema’s 
unique ability to modulate duration. Nowhere are the theoretical implications of  tex-
tual cinema made clearer than in Michael Snow’s So Is This (1982), a self-referential 
film in which individual words appear on-screen, one at a time, gradually forming a 
series of  statements that are alternately philosophical, facetious, and false. I claim that 
textual films like So Is This help demonstrate the folly of  ontologies of  cinema that 
prescribe necessary conditions. I also argue for a more Wittgensteinian approach to 
conceptualizing film, one that recognizes the boundless elasticity of  concepts like film 
and language. However, before analyzing So Is This, it will be useful to situate the work 
within the broader context of  Snow’s cinematic oeuvre.
 One of  the most undertheorized elements in Snow’s aesthetic is his fascination 
with stasis. In some of  his films, movement is minimal, as is the case in Dripping Water 
(codirected with his wife, Joyce Wieland, 1969), in which the only movement portrayed 
is water dripping into a dish.9 In other Snow films, the movement is extremely slow, 
giving the viewer an impression of  stasis. (Snow’s protracted films include his widely 
revered Wavelength [1967], a forty-five-minute zoom from one end of  a room to an-
other, and See You Later / Au Revoir [1990], in which an ordinary thirty-second farewell 
is expanded to eighteen minutes.) And Snow is not afraid to push his interest in stasis to 
its logical conclusion: in several of  his films, there is no on-screen movement at all. One 
Second in Montreal (1969) consists only of  photographs, Side Seat Paintings Slides Sound 
6 Although P. Adams Sitney has called Anémic cinéma “the first film within the tradition of the avant-garde to claim 
equality of title and image” (see Sitney, “Image and Title,” 102), there is arguably a precursor to Duchamp’s experiment 
in Charles Sheeler and Paul Strand’s Manhattan (1921), which combines documentary footage of Manhattan with 
poetic intertitles. One might reasonably contend, however, that the text of Manhattan serves as a commentary on 
the film’s images and is thus more closely allied with traditional narrative intertitles—ones that are subservient to 
cinematic imagery—than Duchamp’s more autonomous text. Interestingly, Man Ray, who assisted Duchamp in the 
filming of Anémic cinéma, would go on to make several films of his own that used written text for poetic (rather than 
diegetic) effect, such as L’étoile de mer (The Starfish, 1928) and Les mystères du château de dé (The Mysteries of the 
Chateau of Dice, 1929). 
7 Hollis Frampton, “Film in the House of the Word,” October 17 (1981): 61.
8 The most notable scholar in the field of text-based cinema is undoubtedly Scott MacDonald. In addition to the 
aforementioned Screen Writings, see his “Text as Image in Some Recent North American Avant-Garde Films,” 
Afterimage 13, no. 8 (1986): 9–20. 
9 Dripping Water appears to be a cinematic interpretation of George Brecht’s event score Drip Music (Drip Event) 
(1959), the instructions for which simply read, “A source of dripping water and an empty vessel are arranged so that 
the water falls into the vessel.” See Ken Friedman, Owen Smith, and Lauren Sawchyn, eds., The Fluxus Performance 
Workbook (A Performance Research e-Publication, 2002), 22, http://www.deluxxe.com/beat/fluxusworkbook.pdf. 
Snow’s film represents a distinctive “performance” of Brecht’s score, however, since the water falling into the vessel 
and the dripping heard on the sound track are deliberately asynchronous.
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Film (1970) offers only paintings, and A Casing Shelved (1970) is simply a color slide of  
a bookshelf  accompanied by Snow’s voice describing the items on it. Clearly, Snow is 
intent on challenging conceptions of  cinema that see movement as its essence. As he 
puts it, “the basis of  cinema as a technology is stasis; the fundamental unit is the still 
photograph. Motion is made from the perception of  fast stills.”10
 Snow’s fascination with cinematic stasis is particularly salient in So Is This. This 
“motion picture” is motionless and pictureless—it consists only of  immobile typo-
graphical text.11 In other words, what is preeminent in So Is This is not movement or 
imagery, but duration. In fact, Snow has claimed that “controlling durations” is the 
starting point of  his cinematic practice, and that So Is This and One Second in Montreal 
represent his “purest uses of  duration.”12 As the text itself  indicates, “the / decision / 
has / been / made / to / concentrate / on / the / distinctive / capacity / of  / film / to 
/ structure / time.”13 While Snow is correct to assert that film has a unique ability “to 
/ structure / time,” film’s status as “a time form” (to borrow Maya Deren’s memorable 
phrase) has been challenged by some theorists.14 Thus, before making an argument 
about the temporality of  textual films (and of  cinema writ large), it will be necessary to 
address these criticisms.
 The most prominent argument against film’s status as a temporal art form runs like 
this: Everything takes place in time. Therefore, film is temporal only in the trivial sense 
that everything is temporal. After all, even paintings and sculptures must be looked at for 
a certain duration (even if  it is a very brief  one) to be apprehended. One of  the most 
prominent proponents of  this view is Anthony McCall (most famous for his seminal 
1973 work of  expanded cinema Line Describing a Cone). In McCall’s view, “Everything 
that occurs, including the process of  looking and thinking, occurs in time and . . . 
therefore, the distinction [between temporal and atemporal art] is absurd.”15 McCall 
further argues that “a piece of  paper on the wall is as much a duration as the projec-
tion of  a film. Its only difference is in its immediate relationship to our perception.”16
 This is a seductive claim, one that is worthy of  careful attention. McCall is certainly 
correct to point out that everything that happens, happens in time. He is also correct 
to suggest that a piece of  paper on a wall may be more like a film than common sense 
would suggest, insofar as they are both likely to offer visual changes over a period of  
time—even if  the piece of  paper undergoes change at a rate that is beyond the realm 
10 Justin Remes, “Sculpting Time: An Interview with Michael Snow,” Millennium Film Journal 56 (2012): 16.
11 It is worth noting that not all textual films are static. For example, the text of Richard Serra and Carlotta Fay School-
man’s Television Delivers People (1973) continuously scrolls upward from the bottom of the screen, in the style of 
closing credits.
12 Annette Michelson and Michael Snow, “The Sound of Music: A Conversation with Michael Snow,” October 114 
(2005): 56.
13 Slashes do not appear in So Is This. However, the fact that words only appear one at a time is destabilizing for the 
reader and viewer. I use slashes when quoting from the film to elicit a comparable reading experience, one that is 
stilted and desultory.
14 Maya Deren, “Cinematography: The Creative Use of Reality,” Daedalus 89, no. 1 (1960): 160.
15 Anthony McCall, “Line Describing a Cone and Related Films,” October 103 (2003): 56.
16 Anthony McCall, “Two Statements,” in The Avant-Garde Film: A Reader of Theory and Criticism, ed. P. Adams Sitney 
(New York: New York University Press, 1978), 252–253.
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of  immediate human perception. (This is precisely the insight underlying Tony Con-
rad’s Yellow Movies [1972–1973], in which paper covered in cheap paint is presented as 
a quasi–cinema screen, so that the viewer can imagine the white paint slowly turning 
yellow over the course of  several decades.)17 In spite of  these insights, I think McCall is 
ultimately mistaken to claim that paper on a wall is “as much a duration as the projec-
tion of  a film.” They may both endure for a period of  time (as all things do), but there 
is a crucial difference: films offer a predetermined and structured duration, whereas 
paper does not. A filmmaker can modulate duration, deciding how long a spectator 
will see a given object or event, but this is not an option for an experimental artist who 
places pieces of  paper on a wall. Obviously, there is no guarantee that a spectator will 
watch a film in its entirety, from beginning to end. Still, regardless of  what a viewer 
may choose to do, a film has a fixed temporal structure, a predetermined durational 
unfolding that distinguishes it from traditional visual art.
 Of  course, So Is This is a remediation of  written text, not visual art, and reading a 
book is temporally distinct from viewing a film, because the reader has more control 
over the rate of  a work’s durational unfolding.18 Nevertheless, text remains temporal in 
a way that traditional visual art is not. Unlike a painting or a sculpture, text (along with 
film, drama, music, and so on) generally has an inherent trajectory that must be fol-
lowed for a work to be apprehended. Unlike, say, One Second in Montreal, which tempor-
alizes photography, or Side Seat Paintings Slides Sound Film, which temporalizes painting, 
So Is This uses the temporal medium of  film to remediate another temporal medium: 
the book.19 This raises the obvious question: why? This is a query Snow anticipates: 
“One / question / which / the / author / expects / is: / ‘Why / would / anyone / 
want / to / do / such / a / thing / as / this?’ / followed / by / ‘wouldn’t / a / book / 
be / better?’” This question implicitly hints at its own answer: by cinematizing written 
text itself  (rather than the content of  a particular text), Snow impels us to consider the 
distinctions between the two media. And the viewer gradually comes to the realization 
that the most salient distinction between the textual film and the written word resides 
in their varying temporal structures. As Mary Ann Doane notes, “So Is This asserts its 
difference from a book through its rigorous control of  the time of  reading. The slow-
ness or the rapidity of  the appearance of  new words on the screen is a play with filmic 
temporality and audience anticipation.”20
17 In the theorizations of Jonathan Walley, works like Conrad’s Yellow Movies would be considered “paracinema,” be-
cause they “recognize cinematic properties outside the standard film apparatus,” and thus find “cinematic qualities 
or effects in nonfilmic materials.” See Jonathan Walley, “The Material of Film and the Idea of Cinema: Contrasting 
Practices in Sixties and Seventies Avant-Garde Film,” October 103 (2003): 15–30. See also Walley’s “The Para-
cinema of Anthony McCall and Tony Conrad,” in Avant-Garde Film, ed. Alexander Graf and Dietrich Scheunemann 
(Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2007), 355–382.
18 I borrow the term remediation from Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, who use it to describe the McLuhanesque 
appropriation of one medium by another. See their Remediation: Understanding New Media (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1999).
19 Throughout this article, I use the term book as a convenient shorthand for referring to all traditionally typographical 
mediums, including magazines, journals, newspapers, text-based websites, and e-books.
20 Mary Ann Doane, “The Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity,” differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural 
Studies 18, no. 1 (2007): 137 (italics added).
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 Indeed, if  one sees the film version of  So Is This in addition to reading the script, it 
is striking just how different the experiences are (even though they both involve reading 
the same text).21 For example, readers of  the script can set their own pace: they may 
choose to skim certain passages while reading others more carefully and deliberately. 
But this is not an option in So Is This. As Snow points out, “The number of  frames per 
word and spaces between was precisely indicated. It’s composed.”22 Because of  this 
careful structuring of  cinematic temporality, a reader is forced to accept Snow’s pac-
ing. At times, this means spending an inordinately long time staring at a single word. 
For example, at one point in the film, the text reads, “one / of  / the / interests / of  / 
this / system / is / that / each / word / can / be / held / on / the / screen / for / a / 
specific / length / of  / time.” While most of  the words in the film remain on the screen 
for just a second or two, the word length in this passage remains in place for almost an 
entire minute (Figure 2). The eye becomes so tired of  viewing the word that it begins to 
lose its semantic content and simply become an abstract series of  shapes and squiggles. 
By the time the sentence finally completes itself, only alert viewers will remember how 
it began. In contrast, certain words appear on only a single frame of  the filmstrip, and 
as a result, inattentive spectators may miss them entirely. This is most evident in the 
film’s assault on the Ontario Board of  Censors, which had previously banned Snow’s 
four-and-a-half-hour “Rameau’s Nephew” by Diderot (Thanx to Dennis Young) by Wilma 
Schoen (1974) for its graphic sexual imagery:
This / is / the / start / of  / a / new / paragraph / from / which / any / 
children / present / should / shield / their / eyes. / Since / this / film / was 
/ tits / originally / composed / ass / The / Ontario / Board / of  / Censors 
/ has / started / to / inspect / so-called / Experimental / Films. / e.g. / This. 
/ Its [sic] / difficult / to / cock / understand / why / but / it / seems / as / 
if  / their / purpose / is / to / protect / you / from / this. / To / protect / 
you / from / people / like / cunt / the / author / discussing / their / sexual 
/ lives / or / fantasies / on / this / screen.23
The taboo words here appear on the screen for only a split second, making it easy to 
miss them altogether. Unlike the word length, which feels weighty and laborious as a 
result of  being on the screen for such an extended period of  time, words like cock and 
cunt, because of  their brief  duration, seem sharp, caustic, and affectively jarring—even 
more so than usual. Through his control of  the film’s temporal structure, then, Snow 
is able to modulate the preexisting connotations of  words, slightly altering the “flavor” 
of  each one. (The flavor metaphor, incidentally, is borrowed directly from Snow: “I 
21 The text of So Is This can be found in MacDonald, Screen Writings, 140–155.
22 Remes, “Sculpting Time,” 18.
23 In fact, So Is This goes so far as to address by name Mary Brown, the censor who banned “Rameau’s Nephew”: 
“Hello / Censors, / Hi / Mary. / This / Film / is / as / clean / as / a / whistle. / Ha / Ha / Ha / Ha / (Hollow / laughter). / 
This / film / wouldn’t / say / shit / if / its / mouth / were / full / of / it. / Gulp.” The “Gulp” in this passage simultaneously 
expresses Snow’s fear of censorship (the nervous gulp) and his utter defiance of censorial strictures (the evocation of 
coprophagia). 
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hope that the spectators can savor the many duration forms that happen in So Is This. 
There are spicy ones, salty ones, sweet ones, etc.”24)
 When struggling to read 
Snow’s taboo words, which 
appear for only a split sec-
ond, one is immediately 
reminded of  another tem-
poral distinction between 
books and films. In addition 
to permitting readers to set 
their own pace, books allow 
readers to return to previ-
ous passages in order to 
“catch” words or ideas that 
they might have missed the 
first time—or perhaps to 
review passages that were 
particularly compelling or 
confusing. But the durational unfolding of  a film does not permit this. It proceeds at its 
own pace, indifferent to the demands of  the audience. (Of  course, the modern media 
environment complicates such distinctions: films like So Is This are increasingly viewed 
online, which does permit one to scroll back and catch passages that were initially 
missed.) Snow’s strict durational control is what makes a screening of  So Is This such 
a compelling experience. Because sentences become subdivided into the individual 
words that make them up, each word takes on a renewed importance, including words 
that are normally skimmed over, such as articles, prepositions, and conjunctions. In 
fact, because each word is formatted to take up approximately the same amount of  
space on the screen, small words appear in large typeface, and are thus more visually 
dominant than the sesquipedalian words that Snow uses (e.g., semiological, psychoanalyti-
cal, incommunicado). Additionally, the experience becomes more participatory than more 
conventional modes of  reading. In part, this is because the deliberateness (and relative 
slowness) with which each word appears encourages the audience to play a guessing 
game, hypothesizing about which direction a sentence will move in and which words 
will appear next. Scott MacDonald describes this dimension of  the film perceptively:
In So Is This, Snow controls time—as all filmmakers do—and we are at his 
mercy. We cannot know what a sentence means until it’s over; as a result, 
Snow’s one-word-at-a-time structure forces viewers to construct a meaning, 
then reconstruct it, as individual words are revealed. Indeed, since the meaning 
of  words is determined by their contexts within sentences, we cannot even be 
sure how a particular word is to be understood until subsequent words have 
been revealed.25
24 Remes, “Sculpting Time,” 18.
25 MacDonald, Screen Writings, 137. In addition to this implicit form of audience participation, there are points in the 
film when participation is explicitly encouraged—for example, when audience members are invited to sing together 
Figure 2. The word length is displayed for a lengthy period of time in 
Michael Snow’s So Is This (1982). Image courtesy of Michael Snow.
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 So Is This calls attention to still another key distinction between reading a text and 
viewing a textual film: reading a book is almost always a solitary activity, whereas 
watching a film tends to be communal. Again, this situation has changed a great deal 
in the past several years, and I must confess that I watch more films alone (via the 
Internet, on DVD, and the like) than I do in group settings. Still, one can experience 
a film with other people in a way that is simply not possible with a book. One can 
certainly read along with someone else, but the experience is not the same. I have read 
parts of  a book with a friend reading over my shoulder, for example, but invariably, the 
experience is temporally asynchronous, if  only slightly: one of  us will laugh before the 
other has reached the humorous passage, for example. But given the fixed duration of  
film, responses become concomitant. As Snow puts it, “Usually the tempo of  reading 
depends on the reader, so it seemed interesting to use film to control the duration of  
reading because control of  duration is a capacity of  film, not of  a book.”26 And the 
fact that communality is a concern of  Snow’s is hinted at in several passages in So Is 
This: “Warning: / This / film / may / be / especially / unsatisfying / for / those / 
who / dislike / having / others / read / over / their / shoulders.” And later on in the 
film: “When / was / the / last / time / you / and / your / neighbor / read / together? 
/ This / is / Communal / reading! / it’s / Group / Lit!”27
 As the expression “Group / Lit” implies, So Is This represents a remediation of  
literary text (broadly defined). One is immediately reminded of  Marshall McLuhan’s 
famous claim that the contents of  one medium are “always another medium. The 
content of  the press is literary statement, the content of  the book is speech, and the 
content of  the movie is the novel.”28 McLuhan seems to be making the (somewhat 
myopic) assertion that films remediate novels insofar as they offer extended narratives 
(ones that occasionally directly adapt novelistic content). This claim clearly has little 
relevance to avant-garde cinema, which often has closer ties to poetry—or even music 
or painting—than the novel. Still, what is interesting about textual films is the way they 
adapt “literary” content in radically new ways. Rather than attempting to translate 
written text into visual imagery, the films provide written text as visual imagery.
 To better appreciate this distinction, consider traditional remediations of  the Bible, 
Western culture’s most influential text (or, more accurately, collection of  texts). Biblical 
narratives have been one of  the primary sources of  cinematic content, from early films 
about the life of  Jesus by Thomas Edison and Louis Lumière to Hollywood block-
busters like Cecil B. DeMille’s Samson and Delilah (1949) and The Ten Commandments 
in their minds: “Let’s / all / raise / our / mental / voices / mutely, / mutually / in / song / (please / don’t / move / your / 
lips). / Ready? / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4: / ‘Some / where / o / ver / the / rain / bow / skies / are / blue . . .’”
26 Remes, “Sculpting Time,” 20.
27 A rather different form of cinematic “Communal / reading” arises when an audience watches a foreign film with 
subtitles. Since entire phrases or sentences are usually displayed (as opposed to the word-by-word approach favored 
by Snow), reading rates can vary slightly, resulting in two kinds of temporal asynchrony: (1) individual spectators may 
read at different speeds, leading some to apprehend textual content before others, and (2) spectators may experi-
ence a “delay,” reading the textual translation of a piece of dialogue before or after it is spoken. (For example, when 
watching foreign films, I often find myself quickly reading the subtitles with enough time remaining to anticipate how 
the actor or actress will deliver the lines I have just read.)
28 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 305.
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(1956). But contrast these films to Andy Warhol’s proposed cinematic remediation of  
the Bible. I am speaking here not of  his eight-hour Imitation of Christ (1967) (a work that 
has only a tenuous connection to the biblical narrative), but of  the unrealized proj-
ect Warhol Bible. Warhol planned on filming each individual page of  the Bible, long 
enough to be read, before displaying the next page. (The film’s running length would 
have been a full thirty days!) It is not clear whether Warhol ever seriously planned to 
bring this project to fruition; it is quite possible that the idea itself  fascinated him more 
than its actualization. In any case, Warhol Bible draws attention to the variety of  ways 
that one medium can be appropriated by another. One need not “translate” the lan-
guage of  text into the language of  cinema—one can simply film text directly. The most 
frequently repeated cliché about filmic adaptation is the claim “the book was better 
than the movie.” Would it even make sense to compare the two in the case of  Warhol 
Bible?29
 Warhol’s proposition does differ slightly from a film like So Is This. While Snow’s 
words are naked, displayed in isolation from any kind of  cinematic imagery, Warhol 
Bible would still have foregrounded photographic indexicality, in its “capturing” of  
actual pages from a Bible. In this sense, Warhol Bible has closer affinities to a textual 
film like Hollis Frampton’s Poetic Justice (1972), in which the pages of  a film script are 
displayed on a table, one at a time, so that, as Allen S. Weiss describes it, “paratext 
serves as text.”30 This explains why Snow does not mention Frampton in So Is This 
during the list of  filmmakers who “concentrate / on / texts”: “Richard / Serra, / 
Tom / Sherman, / Su / Friedrich, / John / Knight / and / Paul / Haines”—Snow 
alludes exclusively to “films (and videotapes) that featured only text, that had no picto-
rial element.”31 It is the very fact that So Is This has no explicit pictorial element that 
allows the text itself to become pictorialized. The letters and words of  Snow’s films are 
not merely the carriers of  semantic information but also visual experiences in their 
own right, typographic formations with a host of  aesthetic and affective valences.
 In some films, the idea of  words as an aesthetic (rather than semantic) cinematic 
element is taken to extreme levels, resulting in text that cannot even be read. One of  
the earliest examples of  this is Joseph Cornell’s By Night with Torch and Spear, a collage 
29 Warhol Bible appears to be a kind of practical joke, although this should not diminish its status as a serious medita-
tion on the distinction between text and cinema. Since most viewers would hear the title and expect some kind of 
Warholian interpretation of Biblical stories (using actors, sets, dialogue, and so on), the absurdly literal content of 
the film would subvert these expectations. In fact, the idea for Warhol Bible is strongly reminiscent of the Fluxus film 
12! Big Names! (1975), in which spectators were lured into the theater by flyers that promised they would see “big 
names”—like Warhol and Snow—only to be disappointed when they realized that the event was simply a textual film 
that displayed the stars’ names in typographical text, one at a time.
30 Allen S. Weiss, “‘Poetic Justice’: Formations of Subjectivity and Sexual Identity,” Cinema Journal 28, no. 1 (1988): 
50. Textual films like Poetic Justice are often characterized as “new talkies,” experimental films from the 1970s 
and beyond that foreground language. (See, for example, J. Hoberman, “After Avant-Garde Film,” in Art after Mod-
ernism: Rethinking Representation, ed. Brian Wallis [New York: New Museum of Contemporary Art, 1984], 66.) 
However, I do not find this designation particularly helpful, since what was novel about the original talkies was not 
language per se, but spoken language and aural synchronicity—elements that are altogether absent from silent 
textual films like Poetic Justice and So Is This. To his credit, Noël Carroll (who appears to be the originator of the 
term new talkie) categorizes Poetic Justice as a structural film. See Noël Carroll, “Interview with a Woman Who . . . ,” 
Millennium Film Journal 7–9 (Fall 1980–1981): 37.
31 Remes, “Sculpting Time,” 21.
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film in which text plays a prominent role. (The film appears to have been made in 
the 1940s, although the exact date is uncertain.) Cornell displays footage of  camels, 
caterpillars, and workers in a steel factory, but the images are occasionally broken up 
by upside-down intertitles that appear and disappear very quickly. Cornell’s rigid tem-
poral structure prevents one from reading much of  the text, and as a result, it simply 
becomes a part of  the film’s atmosphere. Similarly, Paul Sharits’s Word Movie (1966), a 
film composed entirely of  seemingly random words accompanied by flickering light, 
moves at such a frenetic pace (one word per frame) that it is simply impossible to read 
the vast majority of  the words that appear. One can make out individual words from 
time to time, but for the most part, the information overload results only in a fleeting 
visual impression of  shapes and flashes.32
 Clearly, By Night with Torch and Spear and Word Movie offer textual experiences that 
are quite distinct from So Is This, since in Snow’s film, every word can be read and 
comprehended, so long as the viewer pays close attention. Still, Snow seeks to excavate 
more from his words than simply their semantic content. As was mentioned before, 
words that appear for prolonged durations lose their meaning and begin to become 
abstract shapes. (One is reminded of  Warhol’s maxim: “The more you look at the 
same exact thing, the more the meaning goes away.”33) And since small words like of 
and is are in very large typeface, the pictorial qualities of  each individual letter be-
come foregrounded. This was one of  Snow’s goals: “The hope was that the changes 
in scale from word to word will help the spectator to see each word as an individual 
shape, a pictograph, a picture—but also as a shot. Reading, as we learn it, is not ‘see-
ing,’ not ‘regarding,’ so I wanted to introduce pictorial/design perception as well as 
‘reading.’”34
 But one of  the most important questions raised by textual films in general—and 
So Is This in particular—is, what is a film? Since Snow breezily jettisons many of  the 
components that have traditionally been thought to be necessary conditions of  film 
(both movement and imagery), what is left, exactly? What are the implications of  So Is 
This (and other textual films) for the ontology of  cinema?
 At the very least, such films should make us wary of  any attempt to define cin-
ema through recourse to necessary conditions (i.e., “x is a film if, and only if, it has 
the following properties”). Many film theorists have found themselves caught in the 
trap of  drawing strict boundary lines around their object of  study, only to have those 
boundaries challenged by some forward-thinking filmmaker or new technology. The 
result is a series of  (more or less) pointless debates about whether x is a true film. Noël 
Carroll is one of  the chief  offenders here. In his essay “Defining the Moving Image,” 
he argues that there are five necessary conditions that must be met for something to 
be accurately categorized as a film. In the interest of  time, I give consideration to only 
32 Another film that is worth mentioning here is Takahiko Iimura’s White Calligraphy (1967), in which characters from 
the Kojiki, an eighth-century Japanese text, are scratched directly into the film stock and displayed in rapid suc-
cession. As Iimura points out, it is not possible to read the film’s text, even if one is fluent in Japanese: “Certain 
characters can be read, but not all of them; it’s too fast.” See Scott MacDonald, “An Interview with Taka Iimura,” 
Journal of the University Film Association 33, no. 4 (1981): 26.
33 Andy Warhol and Pat Hackett, POPism: The Warhol Sixties (San Diego, CA: Harvest/HBJ, 1990), 64.
34 Remes, “Sculpting Time,” 20.
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two of  them, as this should be sufficient to make my point. According to Carroll, x is a 
film “only if  x belongs to the class of  things from which the impression of  movement 
is technically possible.”35 However, movement is not possible in So Is This—it is a static 
film. Although it is true that the film changes as one word replaces another, at no point 
does the text ever move within the frame. Carroll might respond that So Is This is still 
projected by an apparatus with the capacity for movement. But what if, after attending 
a screening of  So Is This, I discovered that the particular version I saw was displayed 
not via a movie projector but rather via a precisely timed slide projector (or some com-
parable technology that offered no technical capacity for movement)? Would it then 
be necessary to revoke the work’s cinematic credentials? And Carroll offers another 
problematic necessary condition of  cinema, one that strikes me as exceedingly strange: 
“x is a moving image only if  it is two-dimensional.”36 In Carroll’s view, then, is Francis 
Ford Coppola’s Captain EO (1986) a film only if  I watch it without my 3-D glasses 
on? And if  3-D movies do not “count” as a counterexample to this claim, what does? 
What about Anthony McCall’s Line Describing a Cone, in which the three-dimensional 
projected light itself becomes the film? And what if  future technologies enable the cre-
ation of  “hologram” films, which would literally exist in three dimensions? It is hard to 
know how Carroll would be able to respond to these questions without falling prey to 
the no-true-Scotsman fallacy.37
 This kind of  thinking is so widespread that even someone like McCall, who consis-
tently challenges rigid definitions of  film with his innovative works of  expanded cinema, 
falls into the trap of  prescribing necessary conditions. For example, in 1975, McCall 
claimed, “Line Describing a Cone deals with one of  the irreducible, necessary conditions 
of  film: projected light.”38 This claim has not aged well. Given the ubiquity of  films 
watched on televisions, computer screens, and iPods in today’s postmedium conver-
gence culture, few would continue to argue that light must be projected in order for a film 
to exist.39 (And this is not to mention a film like Walter Ruttmann’s Weekend [Wochenende; 
1930], which features no light at all, but merely an audio track of  “found” sounds ac-
companied by a blank screen.) Of  course, it would be anachronistic to expect McCall 
to foresee future technological developments. But this is precisely the problem with 
demarcating boundaries around what a film is or can be: since any conception of  cin-
ema is necessarily limited by the technological and aesthetic practices that happen to be 
current at any given time, one can often mistake the contingent for the necessary. Does 
anyone doubt that fifty years from now new technologies and innovative filmmakers will 
35 Noël Carroll, “Defining the Moving Image,” in Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology, ed. Noël Carroll 
and Jinhee Choi (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 130. 
36 Ibid.
37 Here is a succinct summation of the fallacy by Antony Flew, who originally conceptualized it: “No Scotsman would 
do such a thing. But one did. Well, no true Scotsman would.” See Antony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 251 (italics in original). In the context of Carroll’s argument, the fallacy might 
look something like this: “No film is three-dimensional. But Line Describing a Cone is three-dimensional. Well, no 
true film is three-dimensional.”
38 McCall, “Two Statements,” 250.
39 I borrow the term postmedium from Rosalind Krauss’s book A Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the Post-Medium 
Condition (London: Thames and Hudson, 2000).
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have pushed the boundaries of  cinema in new directions, ones that are simply unthink-
able today? And this should be seen as a welcome development, not some bothersome 
challenge to ontological or theoretical dogmas. Concepts are not immutable, discrete 
entities created by a deity with strict predetermined functions; they evolve over time and 
continually adapt to varying intellectual and cultural environments. The concept film is 
no exception. There is simply no need to speculate about every future development in 
cinematic praxis before offering a tentative conception of  film, so long as one does not 
paint oneself  into a corner by insisting on inflexible boundaries.
 But what is the alternative? How can we speak coherently about film without pre-
cisely defining our object of  study? Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous discussion of  games 
should provide solace to anyone who is troubled by such questions. In one of  the most 
memorable passages of  Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein points out that while we 
have little trouble using and understanding a term like game, this does not imply that 
there are any necessary conditions for something to be classified as such:
Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games.” I mean board-
games, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is common 
to them all?—Don’t say: “They must have something in common, or they 
would not be called ‘games’”—but look and see whether there is anything 
common to all.—For if  you look at them, you won’t see something that is 
common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of  them at that. 
. . . I can think of  no better expression to characterize these similarities than 
“family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between members of  a 
family—build, features, color of  eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so 
forth—overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say: “games” 
form a family.40
This is precisely the approach one should take in understanding what films are. Films 
can be incredibly diverse: black-and-white or color, silent or sound, moving or static, 
photographic or textual, two-dimensional or three-dimensional, and so on. But as 
diverse as films can be, they nevertheless have clear family resemblances that con-
ceptually link them. And we come to understand these resemblances inductively, not 
deductively. As Wittgenstein puts it, “How would we explain to someone what a game 
is? I think that we’d describe games to him, and we might add to the description: ‘This 
and similar things are called ‘games.’”41 And is this not also how we might explain to 
someone what a film is? There is no need to draw rigid (and arbitrary) boundaries; 
film, in Wittgensteinian parlance, is “a concept with blurred edges.”42
 I am not the first film theorist to invoke Wittgenstein in arguing for an amor-
phous and evolving conception of  cinema. In his book The Virtual Life of Film, D. N. 
40 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, trans. G. E. M. Ans-
combe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, 4th ed. (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 36 (italics in original).
41 Ibid., 37 (italics in original).
42 Ibid., 38. In 1956, the American aesthetician Morris Weitz made a similar argument regarding Wittgenstein’s use-
fulness in conceptualizing art. See Morris Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 15, no. 1 (1956): 27–35.
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Rodowick also astutely asserts that “cinema studies can stake no permanent claims on 
its disciplinary territories; its borders are in fact continually shifting.”43 He elaborates: 
“Every medium consists of  a variable combination of  elements. In this respect, mov-
ing image media are related more by a logic of  Wittgensteinian family resemblances 
than by clear and essential differences.”44 However, Rodowick does not seem to be 
fully convinced by his own argument. Consider, for instance, his comments on Stan 
Brakhage’s film Mothlight (1963). To create this innovative work, Brakhage collected 
the wings of  dead moths, blades of  grass, dirt, and other miscellany, and taped them 
directly to the filmstrip. The result is a kind of  cinematic alchemy—the ordinary ob-
jects become utterly transformed by their magnification, luminosity, and spatiotem-
poral arrangement, and the film’s frenetic succession of  images creates an experience 
of  rare aesthetic force. Mothlight would seem to be a prime example of  a filmmaker 
“shifting” the borders of  cinema, a bold reimagining of  what a film can do or be. Yet 
Rodowick challenges Mothlight’s status as a film, claiming that “films of  unrecognizable 
or nearly unrecognizable images such as Peter Gidal’s Room Film (1973) remain films, 
while Stan Brakhage’s Mothlight (1963) is rather a motion sculpture animated by the 
projection apparatus.”45 This is a puzzling distinction. Brakhage’s original creation 
could certainly be conceptualized as a kind of  sculpture, but why would running this 
work through a projector fail to produce a film? (Recall that Hollis Frampton once pro-
visionally defined film as “whatever will pass through a projector.”46) To be sure, Moth-
light is radically different from a more traditional film, like, say, Casablanca (Michael 
Curtiz, 1942), but is there not a clear family resemblance here? As a careful reader of  
Wittgenstein might point out, solitaire and basketball offer very different experiences, 
but they both remain games.
 Wittgenstein has been an important influence on textual films in general and Snow’s 
cinema in particular.47 Like Wittgenstein, Snow dismantles facile conceptual taxono-
mies that resort to necessary conditions. By creating films without movement, films 
without imagery, films without filmstrips, and so on, Snow consistently challenges our 
preconceived notions of  cinema. Consider the aforementioned A Casing Shelved, which 
presents a single stationary slide of  a bookcase accompanied by Snow’s recorded voice 
describing it. Noël Carroll has questioned the cinematic credentials of  A Casing Shelved: 
“I would argue that this ‘film’ is not a film at all; to be a film, properly so called, 
43 D. N. Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 23.
44 Ibid., 86.
45 Ibid., 59 (italics in original).
46 Hollis Frampton, “For a Metahistory of Film: Commonplace Notes and Hypotheses,” in On the Camera Arts and 
Consecutive Matters: The Writings of Hollis Frampton, ed. Bruce Jenkins (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 137.
47 Snow has mentioned his interest in Wittgenstein in numerous interviews. For example, see Andrée Hayum, “Informa-
tion or Illusion: An Interview with Michael Snow,” in The Michael Snow Project: The Collected Writings of Michael 
Snow (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1994), 85; “The Camera and the Spectator: Michael Snow in 
Discussion with John Du Cane,” ibid., 88; and “Michael Snow,” in Scott MacDonald, A Critical Cinema 2: Interviews 
with Independent Filmmakers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 75. For an extended analysis of Witt-
genstein’s influence on Snow’s noncinematic visual art, see Elizabeth Legge, “Taking It as Red: Michael Snow and 
Wittgenstein,” Journal of Canadian Art History 18, no. 2 (1997): 68–88.
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requires the literal possibility of  movement.”48 Snow’s response to Carroll is impec-
cably Wittgensteinian. Rather than pedantically obsessing about necessary conditions, 
Snow has simply said, “A Casing Shelved is categorically problematic. However, it is a 
projection on a screen from a 35mm transparent source. There is no movement on the 
screen, but the movements of  the eyes of  the spectator are directed by the sound—my 
voice. That there is sound, which is a movement in time, is important in considering 
the work’s cinema status.”49 In addition to drawing our attention to the family resem-
blances between A Casing Shelved and more traditional fare, Snow usefully reminds us 
of  the deeply entrenched bias toward the visual that subtends most theories of  cinema. 
It seems absurd to claim that a work with visual movement but no possibility of  sound 
(e.g., Stan Brakhage’s The Riddle of Lumen [1972]) is not a film. Yet somehow it seems 
more defensible to claim that a work with sound but no possibility of  visual movement 
(like A Casing Shelved ) is not a film. Ultimately, either claim rests on an unwarranted 
assumption that we must draw strict boundaries around the concept of  film. It is hard 
to improve on Wittgenstein’s formulation in The Blue Book (one of  his studies for Philo-
sophical Investigations): “If  . . . you wish to give a definition of  wishing, i.e., to draw a 
sharp boundary, then you are free to draw it as you like; and this boundary will never 
entirely coincide with the actual usage, as this usage has no sharp boundary.”50 The 
same is true of  film. Theorists are free to draw prescriptive boundaries, and filmmak-
ers are free to ignore them—in much the same way that traditional grammarians are 
free to insist that splitting an infinitive results in an ungrammatical sentence, whereas 
everyday speakers of  English are free to completely disregard this rule. The concept of  
a film (like the concept of  a grammatical sentence) is continually evolving. The word 
has no fixed definition, nor should we wish to place it in such a conceptual straitjacket. 
As Wittgenstein puts it, “[W]e are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; 
not because we don’t know their real definition, but because there is no real ‘definition’ 
to them. To suppose that there must be would be like supposing that whenever children 
play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules.”51
 In addition to stretching our predetermined notions of  what a film can do, So Is 
This is equally intent on stretching our notions of  what language can do. On both 
accounts, Snow challenges the facile generalizations that we easily fall prey to (e.g., 
films tell stories, language communicates information). Wittgenstein’s account of  the 
malleability and infinite diversity of  language in Philosophical Investigations is especially 
apposite here: “Think of  the tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a 
48 Noël Carroll, “Philosophizing through the Moving Image: The Case of ‘Serene Velocity,’” Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism 64, no. 1 (2006): 185.
49 Remes, “Sculpting Time,” 16–17 (italics in original). Snow’s conception of sound as a kind of auditory “movement” 
echoes a remark made by Daniel, the protagonist of Isidore Isou’s Treatise on Slobber and Eternity (Traité de bave et 
d’éternité, 1951): “Who ever said that the cinema, whose meaning is movement, must absolutely be the movement 
of the photograph and not the movement of the word?” Quoted in Levin, “Dismantling the Spectacle,” 345 (italics 
in original).
50 Ludwig Wittgenstein, “The Blue Book,” in Major Works, trans. C. K. Ogden (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 109.
51 Ibid., 116 (italics in original).
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screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails, and screws.—The functions of  words are as 
diverse as the functions of  these objects.”52 A few pages later, Wittgenstein elaborates:
But how many kinds of  sentences are there? Say assertion, question, and 
command?—There are countless kinds; countless different kinds of  use of  
all the things we call “signs,” “words,” “sentences.” And this diversity is not 
something fixed, given once for all; but new types of  language, new language-
games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and 
get forgotten.53
So Is This introduces us to a host of  new language games. While the standard uses of  
sentences all make an appearance—assertion (“This / is / communal / reading!”), 
question (“Is / there / anybody / reading / this / right / now?”), and command (“Just 
/ think / of  / this / as / entertainment.”)—there are also playful uses of  words that 
represent apparently novel language games. Consider an unusual passage near the 
end of  the film, in which Snow announces that he will provide “ten / solo / words” 
(before going on to provide twenty-five): “And / Now; / ten / solo / words: / Coffee 
/ Whisper / Psychoanalytical / Sunlight / Sodomy / Chalk / Blast / Mind / Duke / 
Mohammedan / Braille / Blink / Simulacrum / Hiss / Mask / Annihilation / Lips / 
Truth / Cuneiform / Choir / Flesh / Liturgy / Cave / Flower / Incommunicado.”54 
Putting these words in sequence appears to produce nonsense, an ungrammatical 
word salad that offers no meaning. Of  course, in the words of  evolutionary biologist 
Stephen Jay Gould, “humans are pattern-seeking animals,”55 so it is difficult to read 
this sequence of  words without searching for some kind of  organizing principle (e.g., 
Is the “Cave” Plato’s cave, where there is no “Sunlight,” and “Simulacra” replace 
“Truth”?). But such a hermeneutic framework risks playing one language game by 
the rules of  another. What is important here is not meaning, but flavor: not only the 
“spicy,” “salty,” or “sweet” connotations of  each word individually, but also (in the 
spirit of  Eisensteinian montage) the novel connotations that arise as a result of  Snow’s 
unusual juxtapositions. As Wittgenstein has noted, nonsensical language can still have 
a measured and deliberate effect on hearers (or readers), depending on what kind of  
language game is being played: “When I say that the orders ‘Bring me sugar!’ and 
‘Bring me milk!’ have a sense, but not the combination ‘Milk me sugar,’ this does 
not mean that the utterance of  this combination of  words has no effect.”56 Similarly, 
Snow’s unusual combinations of  words may be senseless, but there is clearly still effect 
on the audience. Of  particular interest is how many of  the words in this passage re-
late to various forms or methods of  communication—“Whisper,” “Chalk,” “Braille,” 
“Hiss,” “Lips,” “Cuneiform”—even though the passage itself  communicates nothing 
(and ends with a word that evokes a lack of  communication: incommunicado). Both in 
52 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 10.
53 Ibid., 15 (italics in original).
54 This is not the only occasion on which the text proves to be untrustworthy. Early in the film, we read, “this / film / will 
/ be / about / two / hours / long,” even though the actual running length of So Is This is less than fifty minutes.
55 Stephen Jay Gould, Bully for Brontosaurus: Reflections in Natural History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 60.
56 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 146.
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content and form, this passage reminds the viewer of  the multiplicity of  linguistic mo-
dalities, the infinite diversity of  language games that can be played.
 In its recourse to nonsense, So Is This is reminiscent of  Duchamp’s enigmatic evoca-
tions of  cauliflower, mosquitoes, incest, and Eskimos in Anémic cinéma. It also parallels 
another textual film released in the same year as So Is This: Peter Rose’s Secondary Cur-
rents (1982). Like So Is This, Secondary Currents visually offers nothing more than typo-
graphical text, although in this case, the text is accompanied by a soundtrack, one in 
which a voice is heard speaking a nonexistent language. The on-screen text undergoes 
a kind of  linguistic entropy. The film’s words are initially fairly straightforward (“I don’t 
remember when the voice began”), but lucid language eventually gives way to incom-
prehensible jargon (“whose meandering lucubrations / foretold the essential entropy / 
of  euphostolic processes and peregrinations / re-invitriafied by the subcholate stratifi-
cations / of  an ecstatic generative demuneration”). Eventually, we are left with appar-
ently aleatory combinations of  words and punctuation marks: “frisson eldo bas erra ti 
gon / ship to antel k trio lo montre / pi l like s k soke sl abqu ek / dko tj s abi. tu n kto / 
rt l px ex: s at l / t-thel /: kethe ls o / ke lnc i ! u a je t s le / ee tri-sit pn vo tep.” By the 
end of  the film, the screen is littered with random letters and punctuation marks (Fig-
ure 3).57 Of  course, Duchamp’s nonsense (grammatically correct yet cryptic wordplay) 
is distinct from Snow’s nonsense (an agrammatical string of  words), and both are dis-
tinct from Rose’s 
nonsense (random 
letters and punctu-
ation marks that do 
not even form rec-
ognizable words or 
morphemes). This 
diversity supports 
Wittgenstein’s con-
tention that there 
is no limit to the 
number of  lan-
guage games we 
can play—even 
nonsense is not a 
single game, but 
57 For the text of Secondary Currents, see MacDonald, Screen Writings, 162–174. Rose, like Snow, was also influenced 
by Wittgenstein’s philosophy. In fact, after Secondary Currents, Rose released another film about the progression 
from meaning to nonsense, titled The Pressures of the Text (1983), which ends with a quotation from Wittgenstein: 
“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” I should also briefly note that Rose’s early films have a 
clear precursor in the writings of Samuel Beckett, who was similarly interested in the breakdown of language and 
meaning. This debt to Beckett is explicitly indicated in Secondary Currents when one of the sentences reads, “given 
the existence as uttered forth by”—a direct quotation from the beginning of Lucky’s rambling nonsensical soliloquy 
in Waiting for Godot. See Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot: A Tragicomedy in Two Acts (New York: Grove Press, 
1982), 45.
Figure 3. Mysterious sounds accompany meaningless typographical text in Peter 
Rose’s Secondary Currents (1982). Image courtesy of Peter Rose.
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rather a collection of  different games with different rules (or perhaps no rules at all). 
As Wittgenstein points out, “Even a nonsense poem is not nonsense in the same way 
as the babble of  a baby.”58
 Although I am unable to catalog all the language games that Snow plays through-
out So Is This (there are far too many), it will be instructive to give attention to one ad-
ditional example. Contra Wittgenstein’s claim that “the demonstrative ‘this’ can never 
be without a bearer,” Snow refuses to identify the this of  the film’s title—or at least, 
if  there is an identity, it seems to continually shift.59 Consider some of  the sentences 
that appear early in the film: “This / is / the / title / of  / this / film.” “The / rest / 
of  / this / film / will / look / just / like / this.” “This, / as / they / say, / is / the / 
signifier.” There is an inescapable and unresolved ambiguity in these sentences. For 
example, when the film asserts that “this . . . is / the / signifier,” we are left wondering: 
what is the signifier, exactly? The word this? The language Snow is using? The medium 
of  film itself ? Or perhaps all of  the above? Snow exploits the same linguistic loophole 
that was foregrounded by René Magritte when he painted his landmark La trahison des 
images (The Treachery of Images, 1928–1929), in which a straightforward painting of  a 
pipe is accompanied by text that reads, “Ceci n’est pas une pipe” (“This is not a pipe”). 
The confusion that the painting frequently engenders (if  this is not a pipe, then what is 
it?) comes from the ambiguity of  the word this (ceci )—a viewer might initially interpret 
this as the representational content of  the painting (which clearly is a pipe), but this can 
also mean the painting itself (which, of  course, is most emphatically not a pipe).60 In the 
post-Wittgensteinian universe that Snow inhabits, neither words nor films have single 
fixed meanings, functions, or essences—rather, concepts are fluid and in a state of  
continual flux. Snow puts it this way: “Language lives—grows, bulges, shrinks, learns 
to talk, loses its hair. . . . There is a sense in which the cloudiness at the edges of  the 
compendium of  definitions of  Art, which is especially noticeable, is also discernible on 
examination of  all definitions.”61
 Noël Carroll’s non-Wittgensteinian definition of  film, which insists on the centrality 
of  potential movement, would seem to exclude a textual film like So Is This. Reveal-
ingly, Carroll does categorize So Is This as a film, although his reasons for doing so are 
peculiar:
We categorize So Is This as a film because we know the tradition in which 
Snow is working. It fits into an ongoing conversation about the nature of  
cinema. If  Milton’s Paradise Lost were recorded on film—a page being turned 
every thousand frames or so—and, if  that was the only form in which it ex-
58 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 103.
59 Ibid., 25.
60 Snow acknowledges his debt to Magritte in So Is This, in a passage written entirely in French: “Ça / fait / penser / 
l’auteur / au / tableau / bien / connu / de / Magritte: / Ceci / n’est / pas / une / pipe. / C’est / vrai / ici / aussi. / L’auteur / 
aime / beaucoup / le / mot / ‘ceci.’” (“It / makes / the / author / think / of / the / well / known / painting / by / Magritte: 
/ This / is / not / a / pipe. / It’s / true / here / also. / The / author / likes / the / word / ‘this’ / a / lot.”) My translation.
61 Michael Snow, “Trying to Figure It Out,” in Michael Snow Project, 280 (italics in original).
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isted, we would not call it a film, but a poem. The same would be true if  Ezra 
Pound initially “published” his Cantos on film. Our classifications depend far 
more on history and what we know of  the author’s intentions than upon that 
through which medium the work is delivered.62
This contention seems to rest on a false dichotomy: that a textual film must be either a 
film or a poem. Why could it not be simultaneously both? In fact, some scholars have 
written about cine-poetry or the poetry-film as a way of  conceptualizing works that 
that straddle the boundary between these two art forms.63 The idea that something—
literary or otherwise—might be “recorded on film” but not called a film is perplexing.
 Presumably, Carroll is implying the following: if  Ezra Pound had released Cantos 
on film, it would be called a poem, but if  he instead decided to publish Cantos as a 
book, and Andy Warhol later created Warhol Cantos, this would fit “into an ongoing 
conversation about the nature of  cinema” and would now be a film. If  this seems like 
a defensible distinction, imagine the following scenario: I tell my wife that I am going 
upstairs to see what our son is doing. When I open the door to his bedroom, I find 
that his DVD player is running, and I see my son eating popcorn while gazing intently 
at his television screen. On the screen I see only the pages of  an opened book with 
typographical text on it. I return downstairs, and my wife asks me, “What is he doing?” 
Acceptable answers to this question include “watching TV,” “watching a film,” or even 
“watching some really weird film that just shows the pages of  a book.” But imagine if  
I responded to my wife’s query by saying, “I honestly do not know. I will need to do 
some research to learn more about the historical circumstances and authorial intent of  
the object of  our son’s inquiry before I am in any position to determine what kind of  
artwork he is engaging with.” She would be absolutely justified in worrying about my 
mental health.
 Textual films and other intermedia hybrids continue to proliferate in the modern 
era. (One particularly compelling example is the work of  Young-Hae Chang Heavy 
Industries, a Seoul-based Internet art group that temporalizes text using Flash ani-
mation technology in works like Cunnilingus in North Korea [2003] and Lotus Blossom 
[2000–2005].) Such works foreground the mutability of  concepts like art, literature, 
and film while implicitly subverting essentialist ideologies. In fact, interrogating 
artworks that challenge conventional media boundaries is perhaps the preeminent 
method of  coming to understand a given medium. As David Campany puts it, “We 
come to know what media are less by looking for their pure centers than their dis-
puted boundaries.”64 Film has no “pure center,” no essence, no rigid boundaries de-
marcating its territorial domain. But film is in good company here. As Wittgenstein 
62 Noël Carroll, “Engaging Critics,” Film Studies 8 (2006): 162. The infelicitous syntax of this final sentence is quoted 
directly from Carroll’s text.
63 See, for example, William C. Wees, “Words and Images in the Poetry-Film,” in Words and Moving Images, ed. Wil-
liam C. Wees and Michael Dorland (Montreal: Mediatexte, 1984), 105–113. In this article, I favor the term textual 
film over poetry-film, since poetry is not the only text-based medium that cinema can appropriate.
64 David Campany, “Posing, Acting, Photography,” in Stillness and Time: Photography and the Moving Image, ed. David 
Green and Joanna Lowry (Manchester, UK: Photoforum/Photoworks, 2006), 98.
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so perceptively notes, “Many words . . . don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a 
defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of  my reading lamp is no real 
light at all because it has no sharp boundary.”65 ✽
An abbreviated version of  this article was presented at the 2013 Society for Cinema and Media Studies conference in Chicago. 
I thank Michael Snow, Kirsten Thompson, Scott Richmond, and Steven Shaviro (as well as the anonymous Cinema Journal 
reviewers) for their comments and suggestions.
65 Wittgenstein, “Blue Book,” 119 (italics added).
